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MULTIPLE SOURCES OF CONSUMER LAW AND
ENFORCEMENT (OR: "STILL IN SEARCH OF A
UNIFORM POLICY")
Ralph J. Rohnert
In 1972 the National Commission on Consumer Finance
surveyed and made recommendations for improving the legal
and marketplace environments for consumer credit. Twenty
years later, industry, consumer groups, government agencies,
and the national and state legislatures are still groping for a
coherent approach to the regulation of consumer credit. It is
time for another national commission, or similar group, to
make an objective and informed assessment of appropriately
uniform policy for consumer financial services, and to craft a
blueprint for future developments.
I. THE SETTING
Against a backdrop of more than two decades of history, the
relationships among the state and federal laws and enforcement
structures affecting consumer financial services transactions have
become more, not less, complex. The patchwork of sources of law
continues to inhibit the development of a consistent and uniform
policy for industry practices, practices that now, more than ever,
are national in scope and integrated into the larger financial
structures of our economy.' Multiple sources of law have other
effects. They complicate creditor compliance efforts and
compound costs (the current catchphrase is "regulatory burden");
they also produce uneven consumer protection when regulatory
rules vary depending on the consumer's or supplier's location, the
type of transaction or the type of supplier (e.g., bank, retail store,
t Dean and Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University
of America, Washington, D.C. The author also serves as Special Counsel to the
Consumer Bankers Association, Arlington, Virginia.
1. This perspective, was addressed nearly a decade ago in Fred H. Miller & Ralph
J. Rohner, In Search of a Uniform Policy-State and Federal Sources of Consumer
Financial Services Law, 37 Bus. LAW. 1415 (1982). Details of virtually all the
lawmaking described here have been discussed in the Annual Survey of Consumer
Financial Services Law, appearing regularly in the Business Lawyer since 1979.
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finance company), and whether the controlling standard is state
or federal.
These troublesome "sources of law" range from formal
legislation and regulatory implementations, to varying
enforcement policies applied by supervisory agencies and often
imaginative interpretations by federal and state courts. Some of
the frictions come from federal and state competition for
regulatory control; others reflect internally inconsistent taken
approaches without regard for the complications of federalism at
one or the other level of government. Altogether, it may be said,
the problem is a lack of consensus on proper national policy
toward the consumer financial marketplace.
It so happens that this symposium coincides with the
twentieth anniversary of the publication of the Report of the
National Commission on Consumer Finance in 1972.2 This
Report, ordered by Congress in 1968,' was the first
comprehensive review of the conditions prevailing in the
consumer credit markets. Though clearly a product of its time
and not especially visionary, it provides a useful reference point
for appreciating the changes since its publication, and it serves to
remind us of the difficulty of predicting or recommending future
developments. In connection with "sources of law" issues in




Until the wholesale intervention of federal law in the late
1960s and 1970s, consumer finance was regulated mostly by
state law. This included state usury and small loan laws, retail
installment sales acts, various disclosure requirements, and some
restrictions on terms and practices.4
These "consumer protection" laws were reinforced by general
state law provisions, such as the Uniform Commercial Code, and
2. The full title is Consumer Credit in the United States: Report of the National
Commission on Consumer Finance [hereinafter NCCF Report].
3. Title IV of Pub. L. No. 90-321. This was the "Consumer Credit Protection Act
of 1968," containing the original Truth in Lending Act.
4. This background is discussed throughout the NCCF Report. See also Symposium
on Consumer Credit in the 70's, 26 BUS. LAW. 743 (1971); B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN
CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION (1965).
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by state common law doctrines such as fraud, deceit and
unconscionability. Enforcement of these laws was typically split
among licensing authorities, bank supervisors, state attorneys
general or comparable officials, or was effected in civil litigation
initiated or defended by the consumer.5 There was little impact
of federal policies on what were essentially state law
transactions. (But note that there were historically some federal
policies at work, such as the FTC's mandate to police unfair or
deceptive acts or practices,' Regulation Q restrictions on rates
payable on deposit accounts, or unique interest rate privileges for
national banks and credit unions.)
The rise of consumerism in the 1960s prompted activism in the
state legislatures. They passed a myriad of state laws addressing
almost all aspects of consumer credit, from disclosure to
permissible rates and terms. Specific practices thought to be
overreaching were outlawed (e.g., cognovit notes) or restricted
(e.g., door-to-door sales, balloon notes). Interest rate ceilings were
a central concern and were vigorously debated,7 high ceilings
characterized by consumers as usurious gouging, and low rate
caps alleged by the industry to be artificial barriers to
competition.
A "uniform" state law on consumer credit, the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), was drafted and promulgated in
1968, then revised and repromulgated in 1974. By the mid-1970s,
substantial parts of the UCCC had been enacted in about ten
states, but then the momentum for uniform state law waned.
One problem was the inherent difficulty of gaining a political
consensus in the states on proposed legislation that was often
5. A canvass of these structures and practices can be found in the first law school
'casebook" on the subject, H. KRIPKE, CONSUMER CREDIT: TEXT-CASES-MATERIALS
(1970).
6. This included FTC assaults on deceptive advertising and bait-and-switch tactics
in consumer credit transactions. See, e.g., Tashof v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 437 F.2d
707 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (credit practices); All-State v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 423 F.2d
423 (4th Cir. 1970) (bait and switch); Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 120
F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1941) (rate advertising).
7. See, e.g., NCCF Report, supra note 2, chs. 6, 7; cf. Carl Felsenfeld, Consumer
Interest Rates: A Public Learning Process, 23 BUs. LAW. 931 (1968); William D.
Warren, Rate Limitations and Free Entry, 26 BUS. LAW. 855 (1971) (panel discussion).
The debate over rate structures was the heart of the matter, for it brought industry
and consumer spokespersons to the same drafting table. Both Truth in Lending at
the federal level, and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) as state law, grew
out of concerns about the pricing of consumer credit.
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seen as an unacceptable compromise from all sides.' Another
was the massive intervention by the federal government into the
arena of consumer financial services transactions.
Throughout the 1970s, the state legislatures remained active,
albeit not uniformly. States often were ahead of the "feds" in
identifying problem areas and legislating on them (e.g.,
restrictions on holder in due course status). The states also
tended to refine and extend consumer protections enacted as
federal law; this was probably nowhere more obvious than in the
area of credit cost disclosure.9 With uniformity no longer an
aspiration, the states at times seemed to be competing among
themselves for unique approaches to perceived problems (e.g., the
Maine rule requiring that interest rates be drastically reduced on
refinancings, to discourage "flipping").
B. Federal Legislation and Regulation.
The dozen years from 1968 to 1980 saw an almost nonstop
sequence of consumer credit lawmaking from the federal
government. The list includes:
Truth in Lending Act (1968)
Credit Card Amendments to TILA (1970)
Fair Credit Reporting Act (1970)
Fair Credit Billing Act (1974)
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1974)
FTC "Holder Rule" (1975)
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (1975)
Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments (1976)
Consumer Leasing Act (1976)
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (1977)
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (1978)
Interspersed among these federal enactments was the
aforementioned Report of the National Commission on Consumer
Finance, statutory strengthening of the powers of the Federal
Trade Commission (through the FTC Improvements Act of 1975),
the initiation of "credit practices" rulemaking by the FTC, and
8. For a contemporary description of one state's political battles, see Jeffrey Davis,
Legislative Restriction of Creditor Powers and Remedies: A Case Study of the
Negotiations and Drafting of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 72 MICH. L. REV. 3 (1973).
9. The problems of reconciling federal and state disclosure rules are described in
Drew V. Tidwell, Preemption of State Disclosures by the Truth in Lending Act: The
Continuing Quest for a Workable Formula, 40 BUS. LAW. 933 (1985).
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the enactment of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and the
Community Reinvestment Act, both seeking to influence the
lending policies of financial institutions in the direction of greater
community responsibility.
The decade of the 1970s ended with a slowdown of affirmative
federal regulation and the beginnings of a federal policy of
deregulation. Truth in Lending "simplification" was in the
works.'" The Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980,11 responding to economic
pressures of the prior few years, effectively deregulated interest
rates for mortgage lenders, and extended "most favored lender"
privileges to all federally insured depository institutions. 2 On
the deposit side, Regulation Q retrenchment was also in the
wind.
C. Relation of State and Federal Laws
During this period, and into the early 1980s, the relationship
between federal and state laws affecting consumer financial
services was uneasy, and some would say schizophrenic. The
basic approach of the federal laws was one of very limited
interference with state laws on the same topic. The policy was
generally stated as preempting state laws only when they were
"inconsistent," and then only to the extent of the
inconsistency. 3
This meant that state and local legislatures or agencies were
free to regulate aspects of consumer transactions untouched by
federal law-to build up a structure of auxiliary regulations that
would augment the federal laws as applied in a particular state.
And the states did not hesitate to adopt local law in the
interstices of federal regulation.' 4 It also meant that states
10. Cf. William J. O'Connor, Jr., Truth in Lending Simplification, 35 BUS. LAW.
1221 (1980).
11. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
12. See William M. Burke, ed., Federal Preemption of State Usury Laws, 37 BUS.
LAW. 747 (1982); William M. Burke & Alan S. Kaplinsky, Unraveling the New Federal
Usury Law, 37 BUS. LAW. 1079 (1982).
13. For contemporary sentiment, see Fred H. Miller, The Problem of Preemption in
Consumer Credit Regulation, 3 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 529 (1979); Barbara S. Leonard
& Drew V. Tidwell, Consumer Credit Regulation: Is Federal Preemption Necessary?, 35
Bus. LAw. 1291 (1980).
14. A mid-70s synopsis of prevailing federal and state laws ran nearly a thousand
pages in two volumes. CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, PURDUE UNIV., MONOGRAPH No. 8,
A COMPILATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS REGULATING CONSUMER FINANCIAL
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could tinker with the rules as adopted by Congress or federal
agencies, adding substantive details and refinements, and adding
the weight of state enforcement mechanisms or state-law
sanctions where they pleased. The Federal Reserve Board,
interpreting this limited preemption policy, was loath to find
much state law inconsistent. 5
The major federal laws also allowed "exemptions" for states
with laws substantially similar to the federal ones. Only a
handful of states, however, sought exemptions under this
authority. Where they did, state law and state enforcement
agencies became the vehicle for effecting federal policy, except of
course for federally chartered institutions where a federal
supervisory agency had exclusive visitorial powers. 6
Most of the federal laws authorized private enforcement
actions by aggrieved consumers, including class actions. These
could be brought in state or federal courts, and often created
another layer of regulatory gloss as courts interpreted and
reinterpreted the requirements of the federal regulations. 7 In
addition, federal agencies were authorized to use their generic
examination and enforcement powers against violators of the
consumer protection laws.' 8
Even in matters governed solely by state law, there could be
conflicts in the sources of law for interstate transactions.
Common law or statutory choice-of-law rules in the states often
made it difficult to rely on the law of a specific state for
transactions crossing state lines. If the law of the debtor's
domicile controlled, this meant customizing credit products from
state to state. 9
SERVICES (1977). Much of this state law dealt with usury ceilings, creditor remedies,
and licensing structures-topics not addressed in federal law.
15. The then-attitude of the Board and its staff is described in Tidwell, supra note
9, at 936-37.
16. For an analysis and suggested improvements of the exemption mechanisms at
the end of the 1970s, see Ralph J. Rohner, Problems of Federalism in the Regulation
of Consumer Financial Services Offered by Commercial Banks: (pts. 1 & 2), 29 CATH.
U.L. REV. 1, 31-37 (1979), 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 313, 357-62 (1980).
17. The Truth in Lending Simplification Act of 1980 was specifically intended to
reduce the instances of court conflicts, first by streamlining the disclosures
themselves, and secondly by limiting the misdisclosures that would allow recovery of
statutory damages in private actions. Truth in Lending Act § 130(a), 15 U.S.CA. §
1640(a) (West 1980).
18. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act § 108, 15 U.S.C-A. § 1607 (West 1980). This
provision on administrative enforcement was replicated in virtually all subsequent
federal laws regulating consumer financial services.
19. Cf. U.C.C.C. § 1.201. A series of cases involving mail-order creditors upheld the
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This "choice of law" problem took on a federal dimension in
1978, when the Supreme Court, in the Marquette case,2" held
that national banks could export home-state rates
notwithstanding state laws to the contrary. This planted the seed
for widespread regional and national marketing of credit cards
and other products from banks nominally located in deregulated
states like South Dakota and Delaware.
D. Federal Level Frictions
Even at the federal level there was discordance in the pursuit
of consistent, uniform policies. Some of this was attributable to
mixed signals from Congress in the various pieces of legislation it
passed,2' and to occasional agency-bashing for what Congress
perceived to be lax enforcement of those laws.
Further disharmony arose from the way regulatory and
enforcement responsibilities were scattered among a number of
federal agencies. The Federal Reserve Board had primary
regulation-writing authority for all creditors under the
substantive titles of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, yet
enforcement responsibility was parcelled out to the line
supervisory agencies according to their traditional constituencies.
This led at times to unevenness in the interpretation and
application of the consumer laws by the banking agencies, while
the Federal Trade Commission, seeking out unfair or deceptive
practices, seemed to plot a more aggressive course.2
It was argued that the Federal Reserve Board, preoccupied
with monetary policy, could not give the appropriate emphasis to
applicability of local law to resident consumers. See, e.g., Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 610
F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1979); Whitaker v. Spiegel, Inc., 623 P.2d 1147, modified, 637 P.2d
235 (1981).
20. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
21. For example, statutory damages were recoverable for any violation of the Truth
in Lending Act, but only actual and "punitive" damages under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act. Damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act required proof of
negligent or willful noncompliance. The Federal Reserve Board was directed to issue
implementing regulations under most of the credit laws, but not the Fair Credit
Reporting Act or the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
22. The disharmony among the federal agencies during this period is described in
Ralph J. Rohner, 'For Lack of a National Policy on Consumer Credit...",
Preliminary Thoughts on the Need for Unified Federal Agency Rulemaking, 35 Bus.
LAW. 135 (1979). See also Miller & Rhner, In Search of a Uniform Policy-State and
Federal Sources of Consumer Financial Services Law, 37 Bus. LAW. 1415, 1418-25
(1982).
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consumer protection and was generally too cautious. The Board
was accused of not understanding the special circumstances of
retailers, finance companies and other nonbank entities.
Meanwhile, Congress directed that the banking agencies
presumptively must follow suit whenever the Federal Trade
Commission promulgates a trade regulation rule affecting
consumer financial services.' Responding to congressional
criticism in the late 1970s, the federal banking agencies beefed
up their enforcement efforts through separate consumer
compliance examinations.
E. The NCCF Report: A Noncrystal Ball
Looking backward from the perspective of 1980, it is a bit
surprising that the NCCF Report of 1972 did not more clearly
anticipate the "sources of law" complications described above. The
bulk of that report dealt with symptomatic improvements in the
marketplace-reasonable rate ceilings and "free entry," enhanced
disclosure and consumer education, elimination of abusive
creditor practices, and the like. There is no comprehensive
discussion of the preemptive relationship between federal and
state law, nor any recognition of potential compliance burdens
from the multiplicity of such laws. The Report urges the
strengthening of enforcement mechanisms both in the states and
at the federal level, but acknowledges neither the double-
jeopardy phenomena this could create nor the risk of uneven
enforcement by state and federal agencies.
Perhaps the most intriguing suggestion in the Report (but
possibly its most impractical at the time) was to create a federal
watchdog agency, a "Bureau of Consumer Credit," to oversee the
whole arena. That Bureau would
issue rules and regulations, ... supervise all examination
and enforcement functions,... encourage state consumer
credit administrators and banking departments to...
improve existing examination and enforcement
procedures,... monitor progress in the development of
competitive consumer credit markets,... [and] cooperate
23. Federal Trade Commission Act § 18(f(1), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(1) (1979). The bank
agencies did follow the FTC's lead with respect to its Credit Practices Rule.
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with and offer technical assistance to states in matters
relating to consumer credit protection.2 4
Together with its recommendations for federal chartering of
finance companies,' the suggestion for a federal "Bureau" gave
the report a tilt in the direction of federal supremacy over
conflicting state sources of law.
The National Commission, looking at the consumer credit
world in 1972, was not prescient enough to anticipate clearly the
changes that would occur in the coming decade: enormous
demand for consumer credit, the proliferation of new federal and
state laws, dramatic changes in credit products and marketing
structures, and economic conditions that made consumer credit a
significant profit center for institutional vendors. And those
phenomena have now evolved for another dozen years since 1980.
If the perceptions of the NCCF Report were blurred when
written, can they have any utility at all for the 1990s? As
discussed below, they may. But a look at the 1980-1992 time
period is needed first.
III. PHENOMENA OF THE '80S AND EARLY '90s
The period since 1980 has seen extraordinary growth in the
demand for (and availability of) consumer credit,26  the
development of remarkably sophisticated and complex credit
products,27 the near universal computerization of applicant
evaluation and customer monitoring systems,8 and amazing
24. NCCF Report, supra note 2, at 58-59.
25. Id. ch. 9. Such federally chartered finance companies would have "powers to
supersede state laws in three of the basic areas where state restrictions now
sometimes severely limit competition and availability of credit: limitations on entry,
unrealistic rate ceilings, and restraints on amounts and forms of financial services
offered consumers." Id. at 167.
26. Total U.S. household debt grew from $1.3 trillion in 1980 to $3.4 trillion in
1990, an average 10% annual increase. Canner & Luckett, Payment of Household
Debts, 77 FED. RESERVE BULL. 218 (1991). Over that same period the ratio of
household debt as a percentage of disposable personal income also rose significantly,
from about 65% to over 80%, suggesting that consumers are comfortable incurring
more and more debt. Id. at 219.
27. See, e.g., variable rate mortgages, home equity lines, overdraft checking,
combined credit/debit cards.
28. Computerized data networks through national credit reporting agencies, and
sophisticated credit scoring models, permit creditors to do customer prescreening and
account monitoring of a type never envisioned by the National Commission in 1972.
Its report speaks plaintively of the need for increasingly accurate and centralized
data bases, and even suggests "the eventual Federal chartering and regulation of
889
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changes in marketing techniques and delivery structures.29 The
regulators and legislators have become as interested in consumer
protection on the deposit side as on the credit side of banking
relationships. The contextual national economy has gone from
years of rampant inflation through a boom period and into
recession. But there has been no significant change in the
synchronization of consumer financial services law. Recent
activity at the state and federal levels sometimes continues
approaches of the past, and sometimes creates new ones. The
problems of multiple sources of law persist.
Source-of-law activity in the 1980s and 1990s includes the
following:
A. State Action
While there has been no further movement toward uniform
legislation (like the UCCC), state laws on consumer financial
services continue to be enacted. Recently, these laws seem to be
more free-standing, addressing matters not covered by federal
law (such as rent-to-own leases), rather than overlapping or
extending federal laws.3" There are still instances where state
legislative activity identifies problem areas and eventually
prompts federal action, for example, on funds availability and
early credit card disclosures. Some state legislation, though
dealing with the same topic as federal law, accepts compliance
with the federal rules as satisfying state requirements. 1
Sometimes the variety of statutory laws within a given state
leaves doubt as to which enactment controls a particular
transaction. 2
credit reporting agencies." NCCF Report, supra note 2, at 213. Some of the current
practices are described in Jeffrey I. Langer & Andrew T. Semmelman, Creditor List
Screening Practices: Certain Implications Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 43 BUS. LAW. 1123 (1988).
29. Mail order and telemarketing campaigns proliferate. Secondary markets thrive
on mortgages, student loans, and portfolios of securitized consumer obligations.
Market competition is dominated by large holding companies dealing in regional and
national markets.
30. Much of the state law activity deals with rate ceilings and related cost
implications not touched by federal law, such as requirements that quoted mortgage
rates be committed for a reasonable time. But see, e.g., John H. Mancuso, New York
Passes Mortgage Lending Statute: All Mortgagees Beware, 42 BUS. LAW. 977 (1987)
(describing state law that complicates compliance with federal rules).
31. See, e.g., Ferran v. Sanchez, 734 P.2d 758 (N.M. 1987), applying such a statute
in a disclosure challenge.
32. See, e.g., In re Brown, 134 B.R. 134 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (creditor thought it
890
19931 SOURCES OF CONSUMER LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 891
Courts continue to develop and apply general common law
doctrines, such as unconscionability, good faith and fair dealing,
and the various "lender liability" doctrines.3 The Perdue case
from California is an example, and it is notable that the court
specifically found that state common law principles of contract
formation and unconscionability were not preempted by federal
banking laws.
By contrast, a confrontation between state and federal law
produced the Supreme Court's de la Cuesta35 decision in 1982,
holding that Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations on due-
on-sale clauses did preempt state restrictions. This result was
soon codified into federal law.36
The underlying state law for consumer transactions continued
to develop in other ways, such as through the adoption and
judicial interpretation of unfair and deceptive practices acts
(UDPA),37 and refinements of the generic commercial law (e.g.,
expansion of the UCC to deal with personal property leases in
new Article 2A).
Control of the pricing of consumer credit, through usury laws,
was historically an area of strong state interest, and despite the
federal preemption of rate ceilings for mortgage credit, the price
of most other credit products remains under state control. State
legislation on rates in recent years tends either to amount to
deregulation (removal of rate ceilings) or tinkering with the
formulas for calculating rates and related nonfinance charges.
One by-product of the populist, states-rights nature of rate
regulation is that state officials often chafe at the asserted
preemptive effect of federal laws affecting interstate transactions
and bank privileges. This has produced some threatened and
some actual court challenges by state officials.3"
was making loans under the Consumer Discount Company Act and Motor Vehicle
Sales Finance Act, but factual aspects of the transaction brought it under, and caused
it to violate, the separate Home Improvement Finance Act).
33. Cf, Dwight Golann, Consumer Litigation in the Age of Combat Banking, 45
Bus. LAw. 1761 (1990); Sheldon Feldman, Breach of Contract as an Unfair Consumer
Practice-The Orkin Case, 44 Bus. LAW. 1047 (1989).
34. Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985).
35. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
36. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §
341, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982).
37. See generally D. PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW chs. 3, 4
(1986).
38. Attorney Gen. of Md. v. Equitable Trust Co., 450 A.2d 1273 (Md. 1982)
GEORGIA-STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:881
Two recent federal court decisions have brought some clarity,
but also further intensity, to the question of the ability of states
to control credit pricing by out-of-state banks. In Greenwood
Trust Co. v. Massachusetts,39 the state-chartered bank (purveyor
of the Sears "Discover" card) sought and obtained a declaratory
judgment that, since it was authorized to impose late charges by
the law of its home state (Delaware), it could export those late
charges to customers in Massachusetts notwithstanding a
Massachusetts prohibition on such fees. This holding was based
on the language of section 521 of the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,40 and on the
precedent of the Marquette41 case which construed similar
language in the National Bank Act to authorize the exporting of
interest rates.42 Soon thereafter, a federal court in Minnesota,
combining the Greenwood and Marquette precedents, ruled that
national banks could also export nonrate charges such as late
fees from their home state without regard to restrictions in the
customers' states.43
So long as there are hospitable home states like Delaware in
which banks can locate their credit subsidiaries, these holdings
prevent any other state from controlling the banks' credit pricing
and de facto permit a uniform national market for bank credit
products. Nonbank creditors, such as finance companies and
retailers, enjoy no comparable exporting privileges-unless they
affiliate with (i.e., buy) a bank through a holding company
structure and extend credit through that bank. And that, of
course, is exactly what has been happening.
(challenging state banks' ability to borrow "most favored lender" rate); Citibank
(South Dakota), NA. v. Miller, Civil Action No. 88-258-E (S.D. Iowa 1989)
(challenging exportability of Citibank credit card charges to Iowa residents);
Greenwood Trust v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Civil Action No. 89-2583-Y (D.
Mass. 1989) (seeking declaratory relief on exportability of late payment charges). See
generally, Robert A. Burgess & Monica A. Ciolfi, Exportation or Exploitation? A State
Regulator's View of Interstate Credit Card Transactions, 42 Bus. LAW. 929 (1987).
39. 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992), rev'g 776 F. Supp. 21 (D. Mass. 1991).
40. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
41. Marquette Natl Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
42. The holding in Greenwood involves two steps: (1) the language in § 521 of
DIDMCA must be read consistently with that in § 85 of the National Bank Act; thus
state-chartered banks can export rates to the same extent as national banks under
Marquette; (2) Exporting powers are not restricted to numerical "interest rates" but
include other components of a creditor's pricing structure (such as late fees).
43. Tikkanen v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 801 F. Supp. 270 (D. Minn. 1992).
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B. Federal Legislation
The past dozen years saw the pace of federal legislation revive:
the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act," the
Expedited Funds Availability Act (EFAA),45 the Fair Credit and
Charge Card Disclosure Act (FCCCDA),46 the Home Equity
Loan Consumer Protection Act (HELCPA),47 and the Truth in
Savings Act (TIS) s are the major pieces. There were also
significant impacts on consumer financial services wrought by
Title V of DIDMCA, the Alternative Mortgage Transactions
Parity Act, 49  FIRREA,5 °  FDICIA,5' and others. Each
enactment seems to present new source-of-law complications.
1. Legislative (Im)precision
At times Congress legislates so comprehensively and in such
detail that the Federal Reserve Board is left with little flexibility
in setting regulatory ground rules. The Board often must write
lengthy and excruciatingly complex regulations to be faithful to
the statute while also trying to make compliance reasonably
efficient. This is true of EFAA, FCCCDA, HELCPA, and TIS.52
Committing this detail to the statute makes future adjustments
difficult, and forces the Board to make difficult judgment calls
which may precipitate more uncertainty.53 It also makes one
wonder how Congress so quickly forgot the lessons of Truth in
Lending "simplification."
44. Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. VI, 94 Stat. 168 (1980).
45. Pub. L. No. 100-86, tit. VI, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1987).
46. Pub. L. No. 100-583, 102 Stat. 2960 (1988).
47. Pub. L. No. 100-709, tit. IV, 102 Stat. 4725 (1988).
48. Pub. L. No. 102-242, tit. II, 105 Stat. 2236, 12 U.S.C. § 4301 (1991).
49. Pub. L. No. 97-320, tit. VIII, 96 Stat. 1545 (1982).
50. This is the massive bank restructuring legislation called the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183
(1989).
51. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991).
52. For example, the final version of Regulation DD to implement the Truth in
Savings Act, with its explanatory material, occupies 56 three-column pages in the
Federal Register. 57 Fed. Reg. 43,337 (1992).
53. Consumers Union thought the Federal Reserve took some liberties with the
HELCPA statute in drafting the regulations, and sued the Board, with partial
success. Consumers Union v. Fed. Reserve Bd., 938 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1991). This
prompted the Board to modify the regulation. 56 Fed. Reg. 67,233 (1991) (proposed
rule); 57 Fed. Reg. 34,676 (1992) (final rule).
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At the opposite extreme, Congress sometimes does not clearly
articulate its intent, creating uneasiness and risk for future
transactions. An example is the failure in Title V of DIDMCA, to
clarify the range of most-favored-lender privileges for depository
institutions other than national banks.54 The vagueness of the
standards under the Community Reinvestment Act is another
instance.55
2. Federal Preemption
The TIL Simplification Act recast the preemption formula
somewhat, with the result that the Federal Reserve Board staff
has issued a series of rulings on whether specific words or
phrases of state law disclosures are preempted as being
inconsistent.56 Pending such rulings, creditors are protected if
they include the state disclosures, no matter how potentially
confusing to consumers.
The TIL Act still has minimal preemptive impact on state
disclosure rules, and this carries over to the TIL amendments
contained in HELCPA (home equity disclosures). But those
recent amendments also add substantive restrictions on
terminating or modifying home equity line terms; 7
entanglements with state law contract rights seem unavoidable
and will need to be resolved under the "inconsistency" rubric.
Meanwhile, the new credit and charge card disclosure rules
embodied in the FCCCDA carry a separate, plenary preemption
rule with respect to state disclosures in card solicitations.' A
54. It is nowhere explicit in the text or legislative history of Title V that Congress
meant to accord to state-chartered banks the same freedom to export rates that the
Supreme Court had recognized for national banks in the Marquette case. The banking
industry wants to assume so, but the matter is just beginning to get judicial
clarification. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. Cf. Jeffrey I. Langer &
Jeffrey B. Wood, A Comparison of the Most Favored Lender and Exportation Rights of
National Banks, FSLIC-Insured Savings Institutions, and FDIC-Insured State Banks,
42 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 4 (1988).
55. Cf. Connally, The Evolution of the Community Reinvestment Act, 44 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP. 253 (1990).
56. Regulation Z, § 226.28. The commentary to that section includes the numerous
Board staff findings on inconsistent (and thus preempted) state disclosures. Findings
that state law is not preempted are published, but are not included in the
commentary. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 3,005 (1991) (New Mexico law not inconsistent
and so not preempted).
57. TIL Act § 137, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1647. Cf. Regulation Z, § 226.5b(f) and the
commentary thereto.
58. TIL Act § 111(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1610(e). Even this sweeping displacement of
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double irony follows: while preempting state disclosures, that
same section allows states to establish their own enforcement
mechanisms for the rules imposed by the federal law. And in the
same statute, another section,59 dealing with the disclosure of a
change in insurance carrier, explicitly makes a point of stating
that this federal disclosure rule does not supersede any state
laws regulating insurance.
The "inconsistent" standard for preemption of state law was
incorporated in the EFAA and its implementing Regulation
CC.' How this will play out against the comprehensive
provisions of UCC Articles 3 and 4, as these are being amended,
remains to be seen. Potential conflicts, such as in liability for
wrongful dishonor, seem likely.
The tension over appropriate federal and state roles at times
can dominate the substantive issues being addressed. During the
most recent Congress (the 102nd) there was a concerted effort to
fix some of the major problems in the outdated Fair Credit
Reporting Act. Industry and consumer representatives reached
fairly substantial agreement on a number of healthy
improvements to the Act. But the leading bill6 collapsed when
its protagonists reached an impasse over its preemptive effect on
state credit reporting laws. Industry refused to support the bill
unless it contained a plenary preemption of state laws; consumer
groups refused to support it if such a provision were included.
Disagreement over preemption scuttled a useful reform effort.
3. State Overrides & Exemptions
The policy of permitting states to opt out of federal regulation
is employed in several of the recent laws. While Title V of
DIDMCA is primarily a positive preemption of state laws on
mortgage interest rate ceilings, and extends most-favored-lender
status to federally insured depository institutions, that same title
permits states to opt out of several of the federal provisions by
state law leaves some untidy loose ends. See R. ROHNER, THE LAW OF TRUTH IN
LENDING 1 14.03[3] (Supp. 1989).
59. TIL Act § 127(gX4), 15 U.S.C-. § 1637(gX4) (Supp. 1993).
60. Regulation CC, §§ 229.20, 229.41. A finding that state law is not preempted
usually means more stringent state law rules on funds availability apply. See the
Board's interpretation on California law, 55 Fed. Reg. 11357 (1990).
61. H.R. 3596, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (the bill would have been known as
the Consumer Reporting Reform Act of 1992 and was sponsored by Rep. Esteban
Torres).
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specific state legislation reflecting the desire to override.62 A
number of states have done so.
The "exemption" mechanisms in the major federal consumer
laws remain in place, but no additional states have sought
exemptions in recent years.63 States are discouraged from
seeking or maintaining these exemptions by the need to keep
local regulations current with often-changing federal rules. Some
states have, however, sought exemptions under the comparable
mechanism in the Credit Practices Rule (Regulation AA for the
Federal Reserve Board).
Perhaps the ultimate in deference to state law was included in
the TIL Simplification Act. Under new Section 111(a)(2),"4 a
state may seek narrow authorizations to substitute state law
terminology for that specified in TIL, if the state disclosure
language is "substantially the same in meaning." Happily, this
piecemeal substitution device has not been used.
4. Co-opting State Law
In several important instances, Congress has effectively
displaced state law without formally "preempting" it. One
example is in the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity
Act,65  which authorizes state-chartered lenders to make
adjustable mortgage loans in accord with the regulations of
specified federal agencies notwithstanding contrary state law.
Another example is in the most-favored-lender provisions of
Title V of DIDMCA, which authorize federally insured lenders to
charge interest at the highest rate permitted in their state of
location. Assuming this power is exportable, via the Marquette
and Greenwood cases,66 it provides a basis for nationwide
marketing of credit products from hospitable home states,
regardless of laws in the consumer's state of residence.67 Those
62. See generally, William S. Burke & Alan S. Kaplinsky, Unraveling the New
Federal Usury Law, 37 Bus. LAW. 1079 (1982).
63. In fact some states have forfeited their earlier exemptions under particular
federal statutes. See, e.g., FRB Order Terminating Exemptions for Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey under Regulation C (Home Mortgage Disclosure Act),
55 Fed. Reg. 5443 (1990).
64. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1610(aX2).
65. Title VIII of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-320, codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 3801 (1989). See Gilbert L. Rudolph et al.,
Federal Legislation Affecting Mortgage Credit, 38 BUS. LAw. 1311, 1317-27 (1983).
66. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
67. But what happens when a bank seeks to export home-state rates into another
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cases, and the underlying statutes, are commonly described as
preempting state usury laws. This is not technically true, since
they merely establish a federal choice-of-law rule (the bank's
home state law controls). The bank can only export those rates
and charges permitted by its home state law.
C. Federal Agency Coordination
The problem of fragmented federal agency rulemaking has
changed shape somewhat, but has not disappeared. The Federal
Reserve Board remains the primary regulation-writer under the
various consumer protection laws, including the EFAA
(Regulation CC) and TIS (Regulation DD).
The Federal Trade Commission retains its authority to
promulgate Trade Regulation Rules, and it finalized one during
the 1980s (the Credit Practices Rule6"). Both the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board and the Federal Reserve Bank dutifully
followed suit with companion credit practices rules of their own
as required under the FTC Act. The Federal Trade Commission
has recently been reviewing the efficacy of its Trade Regulation
Rules, and has terminated the second portion of the "Holder
Rule," pending since 1975.69
Collaboration among the banking agencies seems healthier
now than in prior years, probably as a consequence of their
concerted enforcement work in the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC). The best evidence of this is the
final agreement by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, and the Federal Reserve Board on a
basic disclosure format for adjustable rate mortgages.70 The
agencies also seem to be collaborating better in rulemaking
jurisdiction which has opted out of that preemptive rule? Which federal
provision-most favored lender or state deference-controls the other?
68. 16 C.F.R. pt. 444.
69. The mellowing posture of the FTC is reflected in Ann P. Fortney, Consumer
Credit Compliance and the Federal Trade Commission: Continuing the Process of
Education and Enforcement, 41 Bus. LAW. 1013 (1986).
70. The earlier four-way split is described in John Jin Lee & D. Edwin Schmelzer,
Adjustable Rate Mortgages: Continued Debate Over Disclosure and Underwriting
Standards, 41 BUS. LAW. 1065 (1986). Essentially the other three agencies agreed
that disclosures pursuant to a revised Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z, §
226.19(b) would suffice for their purposes as well. But see the vestigial footnotes 45a
and 45c in Regulation Z.
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under the Community Reinvestment Act."' But despite
cooperative efforts at the rulemaking level, it is doubtful whether
there is consistent application of those standards at the bank
examiner level.
The FFIEC is not likely ever to see uniform enforcement of
consumer protection laws as its sole or highest priority, for it is
under immense pressure from Congress and the public to help
assure the continuing solvency-the safety and soundness-of
our financial institutions industry. This pressure includes a
directive from Congress to conduct a broad review of all laws
under the jurisdiction of the federal banking agencies to assess
whether they impose "unnecessary burdens" on insured
depository institutions.7" It would not be surprising for the
FFIEC to recommend some comprehensive revisions of the
consumer laws to reduce their regulatory burden on the banks.
Meanwhile other federal agencies, such as the Federal Trade
Commission, proceed without statutory concern for the financial
stability of the marketers they regulate.
There is yet another discordant note for uniform federal
enforcement. As the marketing of consumer financial services
becomes more sophisticated and more integrated into the larger
financial markets, other federal agencies begin to play a role. The
securitization of consumer receivables, for example, may require
guidance from the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Internal Revenue Service. Telemarketing can invoke the
jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission. The
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulates
certain mortgage arrangements. The Department of Education
oversees student loan programs. Whether these agencies can and
will mesh their policies with the federal regulations already in
place for consumer financial services is a challenge for the 1990s.
In the same vein, the consumer credit markets are not immune
from the legal impact of broader public policy concerns, spilling
over from such areas as securities, insurance, human rights,
criminal law, and of course the vast legal and economic
consequences of the collapse of the thrift industry and fear for
the solvency of the bank insurance funds.73 The universe of
71. See, e.g., Uniform Interagency CRA Final Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,163
(1990).
72. This directive is in section 221 of FDICIA, the FDIC Improvements Act of
1991.
73. Recent articles in the Annual Surveys on consumer financial services show
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legal complications for consumer financial services is constantly
expanding.
D. Litigation
The volume of litigation over consumer financial services
continues, though the patterns are different than in earlier years
(e.g., there is much less TIL litigation now). 4 A healthy
smattering of that caselaw involves "source of law" issues,
principally on preemption matters and most of this under Title V
of DIDMCA.7" The federal bankruptcy courts seem to have
become a frequent forum for the litigation of consumer
disputes.76
The sadder commentary is that the sheer volume of this
litigation could almost certainly be diminished if the nation's
lawmakers, federal and state, spoke with a more singular voice
reflecting a broader consensus on appropriate policy.
IV. THE CONTINUING POLICY DISSONANCE
Over the twenty years since the NCCF Report, the political
nature and short attention span of Congress, coupled with the
vested interests and separate agendas of the federal agencies,
have created a climate of uncertainty, indecisiveness, and
equivocation in the development of comprehensive, consistent
federal policy. Add in the persistent but unsynchronized
these broadened horizons: David Teitelbaum, Accessibility of ATMs to Handicapped
Persons, 45 BUS. LAW. 1981 (1990); Robert M. Kurucza et al., Securities and
Investment Advisory Activities of Banks; 45 Bus. LAW. 1919 (1990); Barry A. Abbott &
Helen W. Leslie, Financial Institutions and Insurance: Major Developments in 1988,
44 Bus. LAw. 1013 (1989); Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation:
The Policy Choices, 44 Bus. LAW. 907 (1989).
74. See Dwight Golann, Consumer Litigation in the Age of Combat Banking, 45
Bus. LAw. 1761 (1990).
75. Recent examples include Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d
907 (3d Cir. 1990); Shelton v. Mutual Say. & Loan Ass'n, 738 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D.
Mich. 1990); Burris v. First Fin. Corp., 733 F. Supp. 1270 (E.D. Ark. 1990). In the
early 1980s there was a furious round of lawsuits, principally in Georgia, over the
mobile home preemptions in DIDMCA. See, e.g., Doyle v. Southern Guar. Corp., 795
F.2d 907 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
76. For a sharp exchange on whether and why this should be so, see David A.
Scholl, Bankruptcy Court: The Ultimate Consumer Law Forum?, 44 Bus. LAw. 935
(1989); Lawrence A. Young, 'Bankruptcy Court: The Ultimate Consumer Law
Forum?---The View From the Other Side of the Looking Glass, 44 Bus. LAW. 1401
(1989).
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regulatory and enforcement activity at the state level, together
with the policy of very limited federal preemption, and the result
is a true patchwork of regulatory rules and enforcement
structures. Ever since the NCCF Report in 1972 this condition
was, and remains, problematic for a number of reasons:
(a) Consumers in different states may be entitled to
different rates, terms and protective rules, depending on
actions of individual state lawmaking bodies.
(b) The increasing number of creditors engaged in multistate
marketing must customize their products from state to state
(unless of course they can "export" via Marquette, in which
case they have a competitive advantage over creditors who
cannot do so).
(c) Creditor costs, and compliance risks and burdens, are
enhanced by state to state variations in the law, by the
uncertain blend of federal and state rules, and by the
uncertainty of judicial interpretations of that overlay.
(d) Congress's desire not to preempt the field and to leave
room for the states to experiment and improvise encourages
legislative forum shopping and invites further complexity in
the regulatory structure.
(e) Industry members compete on an unlevel field,
depending on their charter, where they are located, what
products they market and to whom, who their supervising
agency is, and the disposition of local courts.
(f) Enforcement resources are scattered unevenly among
state and federal agencies.
The most serious objection is also the most elusive. That is,
because of the vagaries of combined state-federal involvement in
the regulation of consumer financial services, there is no
coherent, over-arching policy for the marketing of those services.
Individual statutes and regulations set out rules for particular
aspects of marketplace activity, but there is no long-term
legislative or regulatory memory and thus no attempt to
synthesize this year's enactment with last year's. Mostly, there
are no overall principles, even though there are many questions
calling for principled answers. For example:
* Are consumer financial services (credit and investment
opportunities) worthwhile products that consumers should
be encouraged to seek, like health care, education and
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housing? Or, are they tolerated dangers that need health
warnings like cigarettes, or prohibitions or recalls like
unsafe cars or toys?
* Who should be entitled to offer those products, under what
circumstances and conditions, and with what level of
community responsibility?
* Can the markets be structured to permit banks and other
lenders to make informed economic differentiations among
customers, without invidious personal or class
discrimination or over-reaching, and without arbitrary
subsidization of some groups of consumers by others?
* To what extent does a freedom-of-contract model
(reinforced by disclosure) work for those services, or do
consumers need an imposed structure of price and terms?77
* If chartering and licensing rules force various consumer
financial services suppliers to compete on unfair terms, how
should the playing field be levelled?
* Are differences in rules from state to state, or by type of
creditor or type of transaction, justified by local
circumstances?"
* To what extent should credit be allocated or steered to
certain consumer purposes? Which purposes? And to what
extent should this be at public (taxpayer) expense, or the
responsibility of private industry?
* Are reliable econometric assessments of costs versus
benefits possible in this area? How are they relevant to
policy choices, and what are the public policy weights in the
equation?79
77. As unlikely as it may be that the government would ever want to dictate the
design and marketing of consumer financial services, there is occasional evidence that
the industry's inventiveness gets away from them. One example was the massive
credit card fraud resulting from unsolicited card mailings in the late 1960s. A current
instance is the apparently widespread inability of many lenders to calculate
adjustable rate mortgages correctly.
78. The historical justification for leaving regulation to the states was that
consumer credit markets were predominantly local. With increased consumer mobility,
banking-by-mail, and the dominance of national suppliers (e.g., Citibank, Sears), that
premise is no longer so obvious. But a recent Federal Reserve staff study found that
a surprisingly high percentage of consumer banking-for deposit services, mortgages,
and credit lines-is still centered on "local" institutions. Elliehausen & Wolken,
Banking Markets and the Use of Financial Services by Households, 78 FED. RESERVE
BULL. 169 (1992). Still, whether it is wise to encourage states to conduct regulatory
experiments, or supply regulatory gap fillers, is increasingly debatable with each new
federal intrusion. A purely philosophical states rights position begs the question.
79. Legislators answer these questions implicitly, with or without empirical data,
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* Are consumer financial services properly considered sui
generis, or as part of the larger national economy, and if the
latter, what are the linkages?
These questions are posed provocatively, for while there may be a
fair consensus on some of them, it can only be derived from
circumstantial evidence. Individuals may have answers, but they
are more likely to be intuitive than scientific. There is no clear
articulation of national policy on these questions, and related
variations on them, anywhere.
80
At the same time it has to be said that the existing
arrangements for regulating consumer financial services are not
intolerable. Supply and demand seem healthy (given the current
and hopefully short-lived recession). Consumer spokespersons
argue for this or that addition to the regulatory arsenal, or
expansion of the industry's community responsibility. The
consumer financial services industry generally resists regulation
it sees as burdensome or unnecessary, and marketing ingenuity
generally keeps the industry a bit ahead of the regulatory curve
anyhow. Neither side seems to be clamoring for a national
charter on financial services policy.
Regulatory imperfections, frustrating though they may be, are
not stifling industry creativity, expansiveness, or profitability.
And, recession aside, they are not stifling consumer demand. The
question remains open, therefore, whether the frustrations with
the status quo are felt strongly enough to support a real and
serious quest for greater uniformity in the law of consumer
financial services, and if so, how can it be accomplished?
whenever they introduce or pursue legislation, whether it is to enhance consumer
protection or reduce regulatory burden. Consider the rhetorical contrast between bills
aimed at "Truth in Savings" or "Fair Credit Reporting," and recent proposals such as
the "Community Bank Regulatory Relief Act of 1992," S. 2794, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992) which among other things would dramatically scale back bank liability for
Truth in Lending violations.
80. Answers to these questions would not always help at the technical level (e.g.,
determining the precise content and format of savings account disclosures), but should
provide a framework for evaluating the dimensions of a problem and how best to
deal with it (e.g., is disintermediation in the housing markets harmful, and if so can
it best be corrected by disclosure, tax incentives, government subsidy, increased CRA
pressure, or otherwise?).
902
19931 SOURCES OF CONSUMER LAW AND ENFORCEMENT
CONCLUSION
Perfect uniformity, such as by an all-encompassing federal or
state code touching all aspects of consumer financial services, is
probably not necessary, or politically feasible."' But a greater
degree of consistency in the regulatory approach to those services
would help assure orderly growth in those markets into the
twenty-first century, without undue risks to either service
providers or service users. A rough analogy may be drawn to the
need to synthesize the ground rules for securities marketing in
the 1930s.
In this respect the NCCF Report of 1972 was far-sighted. It
recognized the value of having a centralized agency-its
recommended "Bureau of Consumer Credit"-as a repository of
regulatory authority, enforcement oversight, and federal-state
coordination. With monitoring, research, and evaluative functions
as well, such an agency could supply sufficiently uniform policy
to avoid the worst of the frictions that have arisen. Whether a
permanent bureaucracy such as this is desirable now is itself one
of the unsettled questions.82
An improvement in the present regime will never emerge from
continuing ad hoc legislation at the federal and state levels.
Rational restructuring, or remodeling, of the regulatory
environment for consumer financial services needs a blueprint,
and a useful blueprint needs skilled architects and draftsmen
and researchers, 3 who are professional, knowledgeable, and to
the greatest degree possible objective and dispassionate. Thus it
may be time to gather or create a mechanism (a second National
81. The truism "the devil you know is better than the devil you don't" applies
here. This author has sat in countless meetings of consumer, industry, and lawyer
groups hearing lamentations about the problems caused by multiple sources of law,
and devising strategies to deal with the latest brushfire. But there is little will to
pursue a broader solution. The reason is clear: without knowing whether the
substantive results, and the transition costs, will be worth the effort, no one with
vested interests wants to hazard it. The half-hearted acceptance of the UCCC, and
the abortive failure of a comprehensive federal code, are object lessons in the
difficulties of uniformity.
82. For instance, a nongovernmental group analogous to the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code might make more sense.
83. At one level, the National Commission on Consumer Finance was very good at
this latter function. Its empirical and field studies shed much light on the utility and
cost effectiveness of many creditor remedies and contract provisions, permitting the
Commission to recommend numerous restrictions or bans on what had previously
been industry's sacred cows.
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Commission on Consumer Finance, or a congressional task force,
for example) to review and assess the experience described above,
and draft that blueprint for the future. The make-up, duties, and
fact-finding authority of "Commission II" can be debated,"4 but
there is a compelling case that such an effort would be
worthwhile.
84. The original Commission consisted of three members of the Senate, three from
the House, and three "public" members. Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-321, tit. IV, § 402, 82 Stat. 146 (1968). In any current reincarnation it
would seem essential to have some representation from state governments.
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